Kaspersky Password Manager

User comments (primarily from HackerNews, heavily technical audience) reveal deep skepticism about Kaspersky Password Manager's security architecture. The dominant concerns are: (1) PRNG weakness — the password generator was reportedly seeded using system time, making generated passwords significantly more predictable and brute-forceable than they should be. Multiple commenters explain that if an attacker knows roughly when a password was generated and that Kaspersky's tool was used, the search space shrinks dramatically. (2) Founder Eugene Kaspersky graduated from the KGB Higher School (now FSB Institute of Cryptography), and commenters argue this is not merely historical — he remains a Russian state security reserve officer, and the company maintains substantial FSB embedding. Whether the PRNG vulnerability was planted or merely negligent is deemed unknowable but irrelevant to trust. (3) General distrust of AV software — commenters describe AV products as 'virtually impossible to vet' with 'obviously stupid' bugs, calling into question the engineering culture. (4) Alternatives like Bitwarden, 1Password, and KeePass are consistently recommended as more trustworthy, with specific technical advantages cited (open-source audits, native binary components with rate-limiting, better field detection). (5) Discussion of browser extension security notes that Kaspersky used a neural network for password field detection serialized through HTML, which multiple engineers called overengineered and fragile. Some commenters defend Kaspersky's overall approach but are a clear minority. The sentiment is predominantly negative among security-knowledgeable users.

No aggregate ratings were found for this product during the last harvest.